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Abstract
This article is concerned with the key economic characteristics of Australia's mental health system.
First, some brief conceptual and empirical descriptions are provided of Australia's mental health
services, both as a total system, and of its two principal components, viz.  public psychiatric
institutions and private psychiatry services. Expenditures on public psychiatric hospitals clearly
demonstrate the effect of deinstitutionalisation. Data from 1984 on private practice psychiatry
indicate that per capita utilisation rates peaked in 1996 and have since fallen. Generally, since 1984
gross fees have not risen. However, for both utilisation and fees, there is evidence (of a statistical
kind) that there are significant differences between the states of Australia, in these two variables
(utilisation and fees). Emphasis is also placed on the economic incentives that arise from health
insurance and the heterogeneous nature of mental illness. The effects of these incentives are
regarded as by-products of the health insurance mechanism; and another effect, "unmet need" and
"met non-need", is a somewhat unique problem of an informational kind. Discussion of many of
these issues concludes on a somewhat negative note, e.g. that no empirical results are available to
quantify the particular effect that is discussed. This is a manifestation of the lacunae of economic
studies of the mental health sector.
Introduction
Mental illnesses and conditions are amongst the most
important chronic diseases in populations internationally
[1], and in Australia [2-4]. Mental health problems are
receiving more attention, and mental illnesses are now
less stigmatised, in the general population and in several
scholarly literatures, than they have been for centuries.
Topics in the media and the literatures of mental health
professionals and health services researchers indicate
broad concerns over homelessness, youth suicide, the
prevalence of depression, the drugs of dependence and
the side-effects of medications, and so forth. However,
some other mental health issues receive relatively less
attention, and some disciplines, including economics,
tend to neglect mental health issues.
The purpose of this article is to draw attention to the major
economic features of Australia's mental health system or
sector. The initial Section emphasises the heterogeneity of
the sector using a Venn diagram that depicts the main sets,
i.e. the components of the system. The Section also
presents some data on how the size of public psychiatric
institutions has changed through time, as well as provid-
ing an overview of the key economic features of private
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psychiatry services. Emphasis is then placed on the incen-
tives or motivations of participants in the health system:
this discussion is centred on issues associated with health
insurance per se, viz. moral hazard and two issues of an
informational kind (adverse selection and an imperfect
agency relationship), as well as the twin issues of "unmet
need" and "met non-need". Another Section considers the
importance of the range in the severity of diagnoses, as
well as heterogeneity in general, and the implications for
mental health services. There is a brief conclusion that
highlights the paucity of economic studies of mental
health in Australia.
An economic overview of Australia's mental 
health system
Heterogeneity characterises Australia's mental health sys-
tem: multiplicities of services are provided, and there are
multiplicities of localities where these services are pro-
vided. No "norm" ought necessarily be concluded from
casual observation.
Another characteristic is that the boundaries of the seg-
ments are somewhat arbitrary when one attempts to com-
prehend the system. A "narrow", "traditional" or
"conventional" focus on the system is available by apply-
ing National Health Accounting conceptions. These con-
ceptions were defined by Abel-Smith [5], the architect of
the World Health Organization (WHO) classification of
health expenditure. Broader conceptions, involving all
relevant economic phenomena, can also be defined.
These are discussed shortly.
The multiplicity of service providers is depicted conceptu-
ally as a Venn diagram in Figure 1[6]. This Figure is con-
structed with "All Mental Health Services (Formal and
Informal)" at the centre. Each of the other sets represents
other parts of the health sector, some of which do not
relate to mental health at all, for example "Private Non-
psychiatric Hospital-based Services, including Accommo-
dation", and "Non-Mental Illness (MI) Pharmaceuticals".
The universal set is the health sector. Individual sets depict
a service provider, e.g. GPs, specialist psychiatrists, para-
medical professionals, family members, self-help groups
and so on. Some sets are remunerated for their service pro-
vision and others are not.
The Figure indicates that services are provided in a
number of locations. Although location can largely be
simplified to "in-hospital" and "out-of-hospital", there is
an important distinction to be made between dedicated
public psychiatric hospitals that provide long-term care
for the chronically ill, and short-term hospital services for
the acutely ill. (Chronic/acute mental illnesses are not
always diagnostically clear and mental illness can, for
some diagnoses, be conceived on a continuum. This issue
will be discussed below in relation to Figure 3, which
involves a consideration of heterogeneity). Note also that
the provision of long-term care has decreased since the
advent of the deinstitutionalisation movement, which
resulted in community-based service provision. Deinstitu-
tionalisation is not a recent phenomenon: Australia's
experience began in the mid-1950s [7]. Figure 1 also
shows that mental health services can also be provided in
dedicated private psychiatric hospitals.
Although Figure 1 presents the main elements of the sys-
tem, it does not capture all the "messiness" that arises
from the dynamics underlying the health sector. Changes
in funding/insurance arrangements, the temporal ebb-
and-flow of federal structures and so forth are not
depicted.
Despite Figure 1 being schematic in nature, it can be used
to indicate empirical measures of various concepts. Sup-
pose one sought to determine the level of expenditure on
all mental health services (except forunremunerated serv-
ices and opportunity costs, as well as intangible costs such
as pain or suffering.) Figure 1 indicates that this exercise
would involve the summation of expenditures associated
with the various areas, depending on how comprehensive
is the conception of "mental health expenditure". The
nine areas A + B + C + D + E + H + J + L + N would provide
a narrow conception. If one has a slightly wider concep-
tion, that is, all mental health treatments/services and
hospital accommodation, the focus would be on the fol-
lowing twelve segments in Figure 1: A + B + C + D + E + F
+ G + H + I + J + L + N. However, a comprehensive eco-
nomic conception of mental health expenditure, con-
ceived of in the Cost-of-Illness (COI) approach, would
include these twelve areas, as well as opportunity costs
(lost earnings) and intangible costs (disability, pain, suf-
fering, loss etc.), which are not specifically indicated in
Figure 1. Examples of such COI studies are those for schiz-
ophrenia [8] and bipolar disorder [9]. Thus, Figure 1
serves as a guide to the mental health system and, in addi-
tion, indicates the relevant variables, when matters of
measurement and quantification are the subject of atten-
tion.
One partial expenditure estimate of the size of the "sys-
tem" is available for 2000–01 from the Australian Insti-
tute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), as part of an
estimation exercise of ("direct") or "accounting" health
expenditures by disease groups [10,11]. Mental illness
(excluding community mental health services) accounted
for $3,018 m of $49,174 m total "allocated" health expen-
ditures in that year. This estimate is smaller than a com-
prehensive estimate based on an (economic) COI
conception discussed above. However, in terms of thisInternational Journal of Mental Health Systems 2008, 2:4 http://www.ijmhs.com/content/2/1/4
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narrow estimate, mental illness is the seventh most expen-
sive disease category in Australia.
Public psychiatric institutions
Some numerical time-series data on patients in public
mental hospitals from 1906 are available for Australia
[12]. Some States also have more detailed data sets, e.g.
Queensland from 1883–84. However, time-series eco-
nomic data are not available before 1960–61, when Dee-
ble [13,14] collected data on a classification "Public
Psychiatric Hospitals", a component of the WHO expend-
iture classification system. Subsequently, the Australian
Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) has routinely col-
lected such annual data.
Figure 2 presents the available expenditure data for Public
Psychiatric Hospitals from 1960–61 by Government and
Non-government source of funds, in constant (2003–04)
prices. Note that non-government funds are clearly trivial
(in a quantitative sense): chronic mental illness is
regarded as the responsibility of government. The overall
inverted, U-shaped trend is explained, in large part, by the
deinstitutionalisation process in Australia.
Figure 2 incorporates grouped data for six separate state-
based systems. It should be noted that the aggregated
nature of this Figure conceals differences between the
states in terms of scope and data coverage.
A Schematic Conception of the Jigsaw of "Conventional" Mental Health Services Figure 1
A Schematic Conception of the Jigsaw of "Conventional" Mental Health Services.
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Private psychiatry services as an industry
The psychiatry services industry in Australia involves psy-
chiatrists in private and public practice who work in the
mental health sector. Although medical practitioners in
"general practice" (GPs) also provide some services of a
psychiatry kind, private psychiatry is defined (as an indus-
try) by post-graduate education in psychiatry theory and
practice, and examined by a specialist College. When the
required level of education is attained, a medical practi-
tioner may be admitted to College membership (the
"guild"). "Guild" is an historical term, but is used quite
deliberately by some authors in regard to the health sec-
tor, e.g. Enthoven [15]. In Australia, the relevant "guild" is
the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychi-
atrists (RANZCP). In 2004 there were 2,409 fully qualified
psychiatrists in Australia, and 742 medical practitioners
undertaking some training to become psychiatrists [16].
In terms of producing services that require prescriptions
for pharmaceuticals, the entry requirements into the
industry involve the aforementioned medical qualifica-
tions (from a university) and the required periods of
supervised practice, as well as registration with a Medical
Board. Then, for consumers to claim a subsidy under Aus-
tralia's health funding arrangements (Medicare), a psychi-
atrist requires a Provider Number issued by Medicare
Australia. These requirements apply in both public and
private medical practice, except that in the public sector
medical practitioners do not need a Provider Number.
From an economic perspective, membership of the
RANZCP is a key characteristic of entry into the industry.
It is a necessary condition for charging the specialist fees
associated with the psychiatry services, subsidised by
Medicare, which are listed and defined in Section 8 of the
Medicare Benefits Schedule[17]. Due to the definitions in
the Schedule, private psychiatry services can be regarded as
well-defined products.
Economic Incentives under (Medicare) Insurance
In Australia, private medical practitioners operate under a
universal, compulsory health insurance scheme, Medi-
care, which is financed from Australian Government gen-
eral taxation revenue and an earmarked tax (the Medicare
levy). In effect, Medicare subsidises all private fee-for-serv-
ice (FFS) medical consultations, including private psychi-
atry services. There are complex relationships between
gross prices, net ("out-of-pocket") prices, the Medicare
rebates (subsidies) and Schedule Fees. The relationships
between these four variables are considered in detail else-
where [18].
The raison d'être for Medicare (and its 1975 predecessor,
Medibank) is the enabling of "equal access" for Austral-
ians to basic medical, hospital (and optical) services. Its
purposes are asserted to be: " [m]ore equitable financing
arrangements, a redistribution of income to the poorer
members of the community, the extension of benefits to
people not previously covered, a greater measure of influ-
Government, Non-Government and Total Expenditure on Public Psychiatric Hospitals, 1960–61 to 2003–04, $m. (2003–04  Prices) Figure 2
Government, Non-Government and Total Expenditure on Public Psychiatric Hospitals, 1960–61 to 2003–04, 
$m. (2003–04 Prices).Note: Australian data for the following years have been estimated by linear interpolation: 1961–62, 
1962–63, 1964–65, 1965–66, 1967–68, 1968–69 and 1970–71.
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ence over the fees charged by doctors, more efficient
administrative procedures and an improved information
system for the monitoring of medical service provision"
[19].
We now turn to a discussion of some economic side
effects of health insurance. This discussion is directed to
two specific issues, viz. incentives created by insurance per
se, and secondly the particular context of (Australia's)
Medicare.
There is a long-standing literature in economics, stem-
ming from Arrow's seminal paper [20], that health insur-
ance mechanisms (whether public or private) involve
various incentives for consumers, producers and insur-
ance carriers. Arrow's argument was that the health sector
is characterised by various non-market institutional
arrangements due to the inability of markets to deal with
some of the unique features of health. However, one of
the characteristics of heath and illness, viz. the uncertainty
of illness (particularly catastrophic expenses associated
with some illness), leads to insurance. This is a commonly
applied mechanism to handle uncertainty in economic
affairs, whether the uncertainty arises in the events of car
accidents, illness, death, theft, fire etc. Although insurance
improves people's welfare (via the pooling of risks and
thus alleviating catastrophic losses), other problems are
associated with insurance per se. The two major problems
are referred to as moral hazard and adverse selection; and
both of these problems are associated with people's incen-
tives.
Moral hazard refers to the situation that arises when,
because of insurance coverage, the out-of-pocket price of
health services falls and, as a result of this price fall, con-
sumers purchase more health services than they would
have done in the absence of health insurance (assuming
that the demand for these health services is not perfectly
inelastic). Whether or not this behaviour is "moral" can
be debated elsewhere; what is of significance here is that
this behaviour is the predictable response of a consumer
to a price fall, and that a higher quantity demanded results
when a particular set of incentives are operational under
health insurance coverage. This behaviour of increasing
consumption when price falls, when summed across a
population, leads to non-trivial welfare effects in the long
run. This phenomenon can be likened to the case where a
small act of, say, littering or pollution by a single individ-
ual has a trivial effect, but the sum total of widespread
small acts of littering or pollution by all individuals is not
trivial: these acts impose major impacts that a community
bears jointly. For some of the contrasting moral issues, see
the perspectives of Pauly [21] and, in another context,
Kahn [22], the author of the expression,"the tyranny of
small decisions". However, from the stance of the eco-
nomic effects, the increased demand gives rise to a welfare
loss (of a general, or population-wide, nature) that comes
from the breaking of the nexus between the costs of serv-
ices and the prices charged for them. This welfare loss neg-
atively affects (to some extent) the general welfare gain
from the pooling of risks.
There are no empirical studies of the welfare cost associ-
ated with moral hazard in mental health services in Aus-
tralia, and one of the key variables, the value of the own-
price elasticity of demand for mental health services, is
also not known in Australia. Thus, quantification of these
phenomena is an item outstanding on the research
agenda.
The second problem mentioned above, adverse selection,
arises from the fact that health insurance attracts people
who are likely to be large or "heavy" consumers of health
services, generally people with low health status, whereas
people with high health status are not inclined to buy
such insurance. Once more, there is an incentive effect.
This issue arises since consumers possess more informa-
tion about their health status and their personal demand
for health services than do insurance carriers. This is true
for both "the ill" and "the healthy". Thus, we have a case
of asymmetric information, having the effect that the peo-
ple with higher health risks tend to drive the low risks
from the health insurance market. If the low risks stay in
the market, there will then be a redistribution of income
(in terms of the difference between the amount of pre-
mium that a member pays and the benefits received) from
the low risks to the high risks.
Under the compulsory membership arrangements of
Medicare, adverse selection does not exist, but it does exist
under private health insurance arrangements in Australia.
Nobody in Australia discusses, let alone investigates,
adverse selection with respect to the use of mental health
services. Quantification of this phenomenon is another
outstanding item for an economic research agenda about
Australia's mental health system.
There is yet another informational problem that arises in
the health sector, which is appropriately described as one
of imperfect information. Generally, consumers possess
less information than medical professionals about diag-
nosis and appropriate therapy. The presence of informa-
tion differentials over the daily problems of living
explains why consumers consult professionals of various
kinds (lawyers, accountants etc.), as well as health profes-
sionals. The common characteristic of all such relation-
ships is that of agency, i.e. where a "principal" (such as a
patient) employs an agent (a medical practitioner) to act
on his/her behalf, for a fee. These conceptions quickly
lead to consideration of whether the agency relationshipInternational Journal of Mental Health Systems 2008, 2:4 http://www.ijmhs.com/content/2/1/4
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is perfect or imperfect. A perfect relationship is one in
which the agent aligns his/her decision-making with the
principal's (consumer's) preferences: where there is a con-
flict between the producer's interest and the consumer's
interests, the perfect agent will implement actions in line
with the consumer's (i.e. agent's) preferences. An imper-
fect relationship, on the other hand, arises when the pro-
ducer (agent) makes decisions for the principal
(consumer) that serve the interests of the producer. These
issues are discussed in various texts, such as Folland,
Goodman and Stano [23] and Phelps [24].
This imperfect agency relationship lies at the heart of the
supplier-induced demand hypothesis, introduced to the
health insurance literature by Fuchs and Kramer [25] and
Evans [26]. See also Fuchs [27]. Essentially, this hypothe-
sis is tested by inserting a supply variable (e.g. the number
of medical practitioners) in the estimation of a demand
equation for medical services. Work (on GPs and special-
ists in aggregate) in this genre has been undertaken on
Australian data by Richardson [28].
Supplier-induced demand has been one of the most con-
tentious areas of research in health economics. Space pre-
cludes a survey of this extensive literature, but it is useful
to note that replication of the major studies that brought
this hypothesis on to research agendae has cast serious
doubt on it. Consider this statement by Ramsay and
Wasow [29]:
The empirical findings of the early researchers on the issue
of supplier induced demand are most likely the result of
improperly specified and inadequately analysed regres-
sion models. No, or certainly very few, useful empirical
generalisations can be drawn from any of the models as
currently formulated and estimated. In this sense, the
anomalous empirical findings are statistical artefacts (p.
67).
It must be noted that, just as there is no empirical evi-
dence on moral hazard and asymmetric information, with
respect to Australia's mental health sector, there is no
empirical evidence on this third issue, just discussed.
However, there are some studies that can be interpreted as
shedding some light into these various "dark corners" of
the economics of the mental health sector. In 1996, the
Australian Government placed financial constraints on
the number of consultations that specialist psychiatrists
could have with an individual patient in a calendar year.
In one case, reported in the House of Representatives by
the (then) Minister for Health, a psychiatrist had 747 indi-
vidual consultations with a single patient in a particular
year. Essentially, the changes introduced at that time
restricted consumers to 50 such consultations per year,
under standard Medicare subsidies, and any consultations
in excess of 50 entailed a quite different subsidy/rebate
arrangement. An evaluation of the effectiveness of these
arrangements is now available [30].
It could be argued that the background to these changes to
the Medicare Benefits Schedule in 1996 involved the self-
interest of these psychiatrists who were "over-servicing" a
small number of patients under Australia's FFS system of
remuneration of private practice medicine. Such a view is
too simplistic. Some patients do require, at certain times,
intensive consultations with mental health professionals,
a point recognised by the Australian Government with the
introduction of Item 319 into the Medicare Benefits Sched-
ule. In addition, numerous consultations with psychia-
trists may be patient-initiated and motivated by the
patient's preferences. A third possibility is that such
numerous consultations may be a manifestation of a sym-
biotic consumer-producer relationship. However there is
no empirical study which has "unscrambled" this "ome-
lette", and hence any comment amounts to speculation.
There are some epidemiological data (from the 1997
national survey, Mental Health and Wellbeing...[31]) which
indicate that there is some cause for concern as to the
operational efficacy of the nation's mental health system.
This ABS study is based on a representative sample survey
of Australian adults, and generated data, not only on the
prevalence of mental illness, but also the use of mental
health services by people with mental illness, and people
without mental illness. This has led to some analysis using
concepts of "unmet need" and "met non-need" etc. Such
work by Andrews [32] indicates that the problem of
"unmet need" is far from trivial. See also Whiteford [33].
Further work on this issue with an equal emphasis on
"met non-need" is currently being undertaken [34]. The
incentives, or the preferences, that lie behind this phe-
nomenon of mental health services being provided to
people without mental illness, is a fertile field for further
work.
Economic outcomes
There is a dearth of Australian studies that engage in
descriptive economic science about the impact of Medi-
care in the mental health sector. We now turn to some
economic outcomes of Australia's private FFS psychiatry
services under Medicare.
In this section two variables of interest are examined using
quarterly economic data, supplied by the (then) Com-
monwealth Department of Health and Ageing (CDHA)
for the period between the start of Medicare in 1984 and
2001 [35]. The two variables are the quantities of all pri-
vate FFS psychiatry services produced and consumed, and
the gross prices (i.e. inclusive of the Medicare subsidy/International Journal of Mental Health Systems 2008, 2:4 http://www.ijmhs.com/content/2/1/4
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rebate) for these services. The quantities of services are
aggregated across the relevant Item Numbers in the Medi-
care Benefits Schedule [36]. While other variables in the
industry are also relevant, e.g. net prices, analysis of such
other variables is not possible in this paper.
To provide a general context, Table 1 indicates that
32,757,227 psychiatry services were funded under Medi-
care between 1984(1) and 2001(3). Table 1 also shows a
disaggregation by sole consultation (and temporal
length), group consultation, ECT services and interviews.
Sole consultations dominate (95.11 per cent of all serv-
ices), and the 46–75 minute consultation represents
approximately one-half (or 47.0 per cent) of total services.
Table 2 presents summary statistics on quantities of total
FFS psychiatry services per 1,000 population for six
regions [37]. Note that each of the Territories is aggregated
with a State. These aggregations, undertaken by the (then)
CDHA, are a consequence of the confidentiality condi-
tions surrounding the occurrence of "small cells" gener-
ated by some Items. Hence, the regions are as follows:
NSW is aggregated with the ACT (NSW/ACT); Victoria
(Vic.); Queensland (Qld); South Australia is aggregated
with the Northern Territory (SA/NT); Western Australia
(WA); and Tasmania (Tas.). And there is a seventh, i.e. the
total for Australia. Table 2 suggests spatial variation at a
regional level in psychiatry utilisation rates.
The data summarised in Table 2 have also been examined
statistically [38]. This study is concerned to determine sta-
tistically whether the temporal utilisation rate, for each
region, has increased, decreased, or remained constant
under Medicare. Quarterly intercept coefficients are
derived from equations estimated for each region on pri-
vate psychiatry services per 1,000 persons from 1984(3)
to 2001(3). See Figure 3[36,37]. Note that the per capita
utilisation rate for Australia (and all regions, except Tas-
mania) reached a maximum in 1996, and has since
declined. Statistical analysis of the equations using Wald
coefficient restriction tests of the coefficients is also under-
taken in order to test for equality of (spatial) access. This
reveals statistically significant differences between the
regions in estimated coefficient values. Thus, it can be
concluded that utilisation rates for private psychiatry serv-
ices are not spatially and temporally uniform in Australia
under Medicare.
The utilisation rates, just reported, for private psychiatry
services across the regions of Australia during the Medi-
care period need to be considered in the light of epidemi-
ological information. The studies of Burgess, Pirkis,
Buckingham et al. [39], Blazer, George, Landerman et al.
[40], and Kendler, Gallagher, Abelson and Kessler [41] all
demonstrate clearly that the prevalence of mental illnesses
across some populations is relatively uniform. Thus, the
likely explanation of the Williams and Doessel result on
different utilisation rates lies in economic factors, i.e.
"access". Access involves demand variables (such as price,
income), supply variables (such as the number and distri-
bution of psychiatrists), various socio-economic charac-
teristics of the relevant populations, and remoteness.
Clearly, further study is needed of the economic factors
determining the outcomes of the market/s for private psy-
chiatry services under Medicare.
It is also relevant to ask what is known about gross prices
for private psychiatry services at the regional level. Sum-
mary statistics are reported in Table 3 on quarterly data
(expressed in 1989–90 prices) [35,37]. These summary
statistics show that, in four regions, NSW/ACT, Vic., SA/
NT and WA, the average gross price is similar, approxi-
mately $84 to $85. The maximum average gross price
occurred in NSW/ACT. The standard deviations in those
Table 1: Total Numbers (and Percentages) of Psychiatric Services Aggregated in an Eightfold Classification of Medicare Items, 1984(1) 
To 2001(3), Australia.
Service Category by Groups of Items No. of Services Percentage Service Category by Groups of Items No. of Services Percentage
1–15 mins duration(i) 1,884,004 5.75 Group Psychotherapy(vi) 1,341,216 4.09
16–30 mins duration(ii) 6,115,787 18.67 Other than Patient(vii) 76,177 0.23
31–45 mins duration(iii) 6,802,651 20.77 E.C.T.(viii) 180,027 0.55
46–75 mins duration(iv) 15,401,695 47.02 Suppressed Details(ix) 6,994 0.02
> 75 mins duration(v) 948,676 2.90 Total Services 32,757,227 100.00
Notes: (i) Items 134, 300, 310, 320 and 330
(ii) Items 138, 304, 314, 324 and 334
(iii) Items 136, 302, 312, 322 and 332
(iv) Items 140, 306, 316, 326 and 336
(v) Items 142, 308, 318, 328 and 338
(vi)Items 342, 344 and 346
(vi) Items 348, 350 and 352
(viii) Item 14224
(ix) "Suppressed Details" refer to the number of services subject to confidentiality restrictions on data supplied by the CDHA.International Journal of Mental Health Systems 2008, 2:4 http://www.ijmhs.com/content/2/1/4
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regions are also similar. Note that the average gross price
is considerably less in the other two regions, Tas. and Qld.
The standard deviation for Qld is the lowest, whilst WA
has the highest standard deviation. The ranges presented
in Table 3 also indicate large temporal variations from
one region to the next.
These quarterly gross price data since 1984 for the six
regions of Australia have also been analysed statistically
[42]. Figure 4 shows quarterly intercept coefficients for
equations on the gross price data, estimated for each Aus-
tralian region from 1984(3) to 2001(3). One overall
result from this study is that gross prices (in 1989–90
prices) for the services of private psychiatrists are found to
have remained fairly constant during the study period for
all six regions. This is an interesting outcome, since the
general perception is probably that these prices have risen
over time. However, note that this overall conclusion
hides a "mixed picture" in some regions: prices fell in SA/
NT between 1984 and 2001, rose in WA during that
period, and fell in Tas., although the magnitudes of these
exceptions are not large. It ought to be noted that whether
Table 2: Summary Statistics on Private Psychiatric Services per 1,000 Persons, States/Territories, Australia, 1984(3) to 2001(3)
NSW/ACT Victoria Queensland SA/NT WA Tasmania
Mean 26.4 33.8 24.7 28.4 15.1 19.8
S.D. 2.8 5.6 2.9 4.8 2.5 4.0
Range 20.4 to 32.0 21.1 to 42.5 18.2 to 30.1 18.7 to 36.6 10.3 to 21.6 12.3 to 25.9
Notes: (i) Items 134, 300, 310, 320 and 330
(ii) Items 138, 304, 314, 324 and 334
(iii) Items 136, 302, 312, 322 and 332
(iv) Items 140, 306, 316, 326 and 336
(vii) Items 142, 308, 318, 328 and 338
(vi) Items 342, 344 and 346
(viii) Items 348, 350 and 352
(viii) Item 14224
(x) "Suppressed Details" refer to the number of services subject to confidentiality restrictions on data supplied by the CDHA.
Estimated Intercept Coefficients for Estimated Equations on Private Psychiatric Services per 1,000 Persons, States/Territories  and Australia, 1984(3) to 2001(3) Figure 3
Estimated Intercept Coefficients for Estimated Equations on Private Psychiatric Services per 1,000 Persons, 
States/Territories and Australia, 1984(3) to 2001(3). Notes: (i) The notation 1984(3) refers to the third (September) 
quarter of 1984, etc. (ii) The psychiatric services referred to here relate to the aggregate of the Item Numbers listed in the 
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the productivity of private psychiatry treatment in this
period of time has risen, fallen or remained constant, is
not known for Australia. Further analysis of the differ-
ences in the equations, using Wald coefficient restriction
tests, was undertaken. This analysis shows that, although
spatial price differences for private psychiatry services pre-
dominate, there is, in all, a mixed picture, spatially, of
price similarities and differences.
It should be noted that economic issues can also be stud-
ied in the sub-sets of psychiatry Items in the Medicare
Schedule. For example, a single economic study is availa-
ble for private sector ECT utilisation rates across the
regions of Australia [43].
Much additional analysis is required of Medicare data
from a range of economic perspectives. Apart from devel-
oping explanatory models using regression analysis to
determine the factors that explain utilisation patterns,
such as those already described, the analysis of the data at
a lower level of geographical aggregation than the broad
state/territory regions of Australia is important. Doing so
will measure the likely extent of differences in utilisation
between metropolitan, minor city, rural and remote
regions of Australia. The same applies to gross and net
prices. Note also that the construction of price indices for
psychiatry services is possible also from Medicare data.
Moreover, the application of the conventional measures
of economic inequality and concentration employed by
economists to mental health variables is relevant.
The available economic studies on Australian mental
health issues are extensively reviewed in Williams and
Doessel [44,45]. The earlier of these two surveys [44] pro-
vides the more comprehensive account of the state of
empirical economic knowledge, at the time of writing,
about the mental health system. The survey includes not
only economic studies but also the important contribu-
tions from (mental) health services research. Also
included in the survey are the studies about the "grey
areas" of the mental health system, i.e. economic research
about the two main co-morbidities, intellectual disability
and substance abuse. The studies that have been under-
taken by psychiatrists, psychologists and other health pro-
fessionals in Australia, who have crossed their own
discipline boundaries in order to address the pressing
issues of the mental health system, are also highlighted.
Having described some economic dimensions of Aus-
tralia's mental health system, the focus will turn to a brief
discussion of the relationship between mental illness and
the mental health sector.
Australia's mental health system and mental 
illness
Mental disorders involve a broad spectrum of illnesses
and conditions whose impact ranges from being
extremely disabling to quite mild [46,47]. As pointed out
above [32], only a fraction of people with mental illness
consumes mental health services: thus many, even with
psychoses, have no contact with the mental health system.
On the other hand there are many people (who do not
meet the criteria of a mental illness) who do consume
mental health services. The motive for this utilisation may
be for the purposes of achievement or self-fulfilment
[48,49]. Others, the "worried well" [50,51], also seek
help, but their conditions are not within the conventional
diagnostic criteria of mental illness. There are no Austral-
ian studies that indicate the relative importance of the
effects of these various motives.
A stylisation of the groups described in the previous para-
graph is provided in Figure 5[52], which presents a dis-
tinction between serious mental illness at the core and
mild conditions that are commonly experienced difficul-
ties in coping with stress and distress, and thirdly the rea-
sons for seeking help that involve those who wish to
enhance themselves in their life roles. The distinction
Table 3: Summary Statistics on Gross Prices for Private Psychiatric Services for the States/Territories, Australia, $s (1989–90 Prices), 
1984(3) to 2001(3)
NSW/ACT Victoria Queensland SA/NT WA Tasmania
Mean 85.38 84.02 77.63 83.95 84.95 75.12
S.D. 2.95 2.09 1.66 3.17 3.05 4.29
Range 81.11 to 94.60 77.44 to 87.12 74.30 to 81.11 78.05 to 90.02 77.34 to 90.36 64.58 to 83.26
Notes: (i) Items 134, 300, 310, 320 and 330
(ii) Items 138, 304, 314, 324 and 334
(iii) Items 136, 302, 312, 322 and 332
(iv) Items 140, 306, 316, 326 and 336
(ix) Items 142, 308, 318, 328 and 338
(vi) Items 342, 344 and 346
(x) Items 348, 350 and 352
(viii) Item 14224
(xi) "Suppressed Details" refer to the number of services subject to confidentiality restrictions on data supplied by the CDHA.International Journal of Mental Health Systems 2008, 2:4 http://www.ijmhs.com/content/2/1/4
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between these groups is not a trivial concern, as the fund-
ing of health services enables the non-sick to access gov-
ernment-subsidised or government-provided services.
Given the private nature (in the economic sense) of med-
ical services, such behaviour denies these scarce services to
the mentally ill.
It is often suggested that allocated resources to Australia's
mental health system are inadequate. However, the con-
cern that Andrews [32] and Whiteford [33] express is the
dilemma of "structural imbalance". Doessel, Williams
and Nolan [34] demonstrate the dimensions of this phe-
nomenon, and argue that "throwing more money" at the
pre-existing structures in Australia will have little effect on
the structural imbalance in Australia's mental health sys-
tem. They suggest some possible measures for reform to
address this structural imbalance dilemma.
Conclusion
This paper has addressed a relatively small number of
questions associated with Australia's mental health sector,
and the approach taken is, in large part, from the disci-
pline of economics. For example, the emphasis placed on
incentives is well established as an approach relevant to
the scope of economics. This is not to suggest that other
approaches, say, that of a health services research kind, are
not relevant. It has been argued elsewhere that these are
complementary (not substitutable) ways of analysing
mental health issues [53]. These two approaches ask dif-
ferent, but related, questions.
Mental health clearly is a relatively untilled field for econ-
omists. Many empirical gaps exist in regard to both the
private and public sectors. Also, work at a more concep-
tual level is very relevant to publicly provided mental
health services, such as LeGrand's analyses with respect to
the types of structural changes appropriate to the (non-
market) National Health Service (NHS) in Britain [54-57].
The Diagnostic Spectrum Figure 5
The Diagnostic Spectrum.
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Researchers of the economics of Australia's mental health
system are likely to find no shortage of topics, but concep-
tual and practical problems are more intractable in the
analysis of mental health than in health care generally.
The crafting of research questions is of paramount impor-
tance. Also, some of the characteristics of mental health
services have more in common with markets for disability
services than medical services.
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